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1 Computer Metaphors

    Misgivings about Computer Metaphors of the Human Brain

   Within the AI community there is a growing dissatisfaction concerning the adequacy of sequential models to simulate the cognitive processes....

   For an example of the dissimilarity between computers and nervous systems, consider that in conventional computers... each piece of data [is] located in its own special space in the memory bank [and] can be retrieved only by a central processor that knows the address in the memory bank for each datum. Human memory appears to be organized along entirely different lines. For one thing, from a partial or a degraded stimulus human memory can "reconstruct" the rest, and there are associative relationships among stored pieces of information based on considerations of context rather than on considerations of location.... t now appears doubtful that individual neurons are so specific that they are tuned to respond to a single item and nothing else. Thus, connectionist models tend to devise and use distributed principles, which means that elements may be selective to a range of stimuli and there are no "grandmother cells."...

   Information storage, it appears, is in some ill-defined sense a function of connectivity among sets of neurons. This implies that there is something fundamentally wrong in understanding the brain's memory on the model of individual symbols stored at unique addresses in a data bank....

   A further source of misgivings about the computer metaphor concerns real-time constraints. Although the signal velocities in nervous systems are quite slow in comparison to those in computers, brains are nonetheless far, far faster than electronic devices in the execution of their complex tasks. For example, human brains are incomparably faster than any computer in word-nonword recognition tasks. (P. S. Churchland, 1986, pp. 458-459)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Computer Metaphors
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Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Bibliography
3 modelo informático

m.

computer model.

* * *

(n.) = computer model

Ex. Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

* * *

(n.) = computer model

Ex: Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

Spanish-English dictionary > modelo informático
4 modelo por ordenador

(n.) = computer model

Ex. Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

* * *

(n.) = computer model

Ex: Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

Spanish-English dictionary > modelo por ordenador
5 Artificial Intelligence

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inﬂated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins ﬂy? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can ﬂy, so robins probably can ﬂy."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Artificial Intelligence
6 azucarera

f.

1 sugar refinery.

2 sugar bowl, sugar basin.

3 sugarhouse.

* * *

azucarera

► nombre femenino

1 (vasija) sugarbowl

2 (fábrica) sugar factory

* * *

SF sugar refinery

* * *

femenino

a) (AmL) ( recipiente) sugar bowl

b) ( fábrica) sugar refinery

* * *

= sugar mill, beet sugar factory, sugar factory.

Ex. Literacy has been brought directly into the workplace with the introduction of libraries into factories and sugar mills.

Ex. This article presents an approach to help beet sugar factories reduce water and effluent.

Ex. Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

----

* fábrica azucarera = sugar mill.

* * *

femenino

a) (AmL) ( recipiente) sugar bowl

b) ( fábrica) sugar refinery

* * *

= sugar mill, beet sugar factory, sugar factory.

Ex: Literacy has been brought directly into the workplace with the introduction of libraries into factories and sugar mills.

Ex: This article presents an approach to help beet sugar factories reduce water and effluent.

Ex: Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

* fábrica azucarera = sugar mill.

* * *

azucarera

feminine

1 ( AmL) (recipiente) sugar bowl

2 (fábrica) sugar refinery

* * *

azucarera sustantivo femenino
a) (AmL) ( recipiente) sugar bowl

b) ( fábrica) sugar refinery

azucarero,-a
1 sustantivo masculino & sustantivo femenino sugar bowl
II adjetivo sugar
la industria azucarera, sugar industry
' azucarera' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
azucarero
- remolacha
English:
beet
- sugar beet
- sugar

* * *

azucarera nf

1. [fábrica] sugar refinery

2. [recipiente] sugar bowl

* * *

azucarera

f sugar bowl

* * *

azucarera nf

: sugar bowl

Spanish-English dictionary > azucarera
7 fábrica de azúcar

(n.) = sugar factory

Ex. Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

* * *

(n.) = sugar factory

Ex: Over the years, a number of computer models have been developed by Sugar for use in sugar factory design.

Spanish-English dictionary > fábrica de azúcar
8 впервые применить

•
Our group pioneered in applying these operational techniques to the above-discussed process.

•
He pioneered the application of computer models for...

Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > впервые применить
9 впервые применить

•
Our group pioneered in applying these operational techniques to the above-discussed process.

•
He pioneered the application of computer models for...

Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > впервые применить
10 компьютерные модели общения

Linguistics: computer models of communication

Универсальный русско-английский словарь > компьютерные модели общения
11 работа возникла в связи с

Работа возникла в связи с-- In fact, this project originated because of the concern of steel manufacturers regarding the predictive capabilities of several computer models.

Русско-английский научно-технический словарь переводчика > работа возникла в связи с
12 línea telefónica

f.

telephone line.

* * *

(n.) = phone line, telephone line

Ex. A modem is an electronic device which converts or modulates data coming from a computer into audio tunes which can be carried over normal phone lines and demodulates incoming tones from the phone line into data that can be used by the computer.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

* * *

(n.) = phone line, telephone line

Ex: A modem is an electronic device which converts or modulates data coming from a computer into audio tunes which can be carried over normal phone lines and demodulates incoming tones from the phone line into data that can be used by the computer.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Spanish-English dictionary > línea telefónica
13 Language

   1) The Book of Nature Is Written in the Language of Mathematics

   Philosophy is written in that great book, the universe, which is always open, right before our eyes. But one cannot understand this book without first learning to understand the language and to know the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of mathematics, and the characters are triangles, circles, and other figures. Without these, one cannot understand a single word of it, and just wanders in a dark labyrinth. (Galileo, 1990, p. 232)

   2) Arranging Speech so as to Reply Appropriately

   It never happens that it [a nonhuman animal] arranges its speech in various ways in order to reply appropriately to everything that may be said in its presence, as even the lowest type of man can do. (Descartes, 1970a, p. 116)

   3) No Other Animal Has the Language Capacity of the Human

   It is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even excepting idiots, that they cannot arrange different words together, forming of them a statement by which they make known their thoughts; while, on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect and fortunately circumstanced it may be, which can do the same. (Descartes, 1967, p. 116)

   4) Human Beings Do Not Live Only in the World of Objects

   Human beings do not live in the object world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reﬂection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built on the language habits of the group.... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Sapir, 1921, p. 75)

   5) Language Powerfully Conditions All Our Thinking

   It powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes.... No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same worlds with different labels attached. (Sapir, 1985, p. 162)

   6) A List of Language Games

   [A list of language games, not meant to be exhaustive:]

   Giving orders, and obeying them- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements- Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)Reporting an eventSpeculating about an eventForming and testing a hypothesisPresenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagramsMaking up a story; and reading itPlay actingSinging catchesGuessing riddlesMaking a joke; and telling it

   Solving a problem in practical arithmeticTranslating from one language into another

   LANGUAGE Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, and praying-. (Wittgenstein, 1953, Pt. I, No. 23, pp. 11 e-12 e)

   7) Language Constrains Certain Modes of Interpretation

   We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages.... The world is presented in a kaleidoscopic ﬂux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... No individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 153, 213-214)

   8) We Dissect Nature in Accordance with Our Native Languages

   We dissect nature along the lines laid down by our native languages.

   The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic ﬂux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds-and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.... We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity, which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar or can in some way be calibrated. (Whorf, 1956, pp. 213-214)

   9) The Forms of a Person's Thoughts Are Controlled by Unperceived Patterns of His Own Language

   The forms of a person's thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language-shown readily enough by a candid comparison and contrast with other languages, especially those of a different linguistic family. (Whorf, 1956, p. 252)

    10) The Analysis of Certain Types of Utterances

   It has come to be commonly held that many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information about the facts.... Many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-the mistake of taking as straightforward statements of fact utterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite different. (Austin, 1962, pp. 2-3)

    11) The Dictionary of a Language Is a System of Concepts

   In general, one might define a complex of semantic components connected by logical constants as a concept. The dictionary of a language is then a system of concepts in which a phonological form and certain syntactic and morphological characteristics are assigned to each concept. This system of concepts is structured by several types of relations. It is supplemented, furthermore, by redundancy or implicational rules..., representing general properties of the whole system of concepts.... At least a relevant part of these general rules is not bound to particular languages, but represents presumably universal structures of natural languages. They are not learned, but are rather a part of the human ability to acquire an arbitrary natural language. (Bierwisch, 1970, pp. 171-172)

    12) Talk about the Evolution of the Language Capacity is Beside the Point

   In studying the evolution of mind, we cannot guess to what extent there are physically possible alternatives to, say, transformational generative grammar, for an organism meeting certain other physical conditions characteristic of humans. Conceivably, there are none-or very few-in which case talk about evolution of the language capacity is beside the point. (Chomsky, 1972, p. 98)

    13) The Development of Language

   [It is] truth value rather than syntactic well-formedness that chieﬂy governs explicit verbal reinforcement by parents-which renders mildly paradoxical the fact that the usual product of such a training schedule is an adult whose speech is highly grammatical but not notably truthful. (R. O. Brown, 1973, p. 330)

    14) Sentential and Conceptual Levels in Language

   he conceptual base is responsible for formally representing the concepts underlying an utterance.... A given word in a language may or may not have one or more concepts underlying it.... On the sentential level, the utterances of a given language are encoded within a syntactic structure of that language. The basic construction of the sentential level is the sentence.

   The next highest level... is the conceptual level. We call the basic construction of this level the conceptualization. A conceptualization consists of concepts and certain relations among those concepts. We can consider that both levels exist at the same point in time and that for any unit on one level, some corresponding realizate exists on the other level. This realizate may be null or extremely complex.... Conceptualizations may relate to other conceptualizations by nesting or other specified relationships. (Schank, 1973, pp. 191-192)

    15) Linguistic Realities Have Not Yet Been Captured by Theoretical Models

   The mathematics of multi-dimensional interactive spaces and lattices, the projection of "computer behavior" on to possible models of cerebral functions, the theoretical and mechanical investigation of artificial intelligence, are producing a stream of sophisticated, often suggestive ideas.

   But it is, I believe, fair to say that nothing put forward until now in either theoretic design or mechanical mimicry comes even remotely in reach of the most rudimentary linguistic realities. (Steiner, 1975, p. 284)

    16) The Final Steps to Human Language

   The step from the simple tool to the master tool, a tool to make tools (what we would now call a machine tool), seems to me indeed to parallel the final step to human language, which I call reconstitution. It expresses in a practical and social context the same understanding of hierarchy, and shows the same analysis by function as a basis for synthesis. (Bronowski, 1977, pp. 127-128)

    17) The Inadequacy of Formal Linguistic Models for Ordinary Language Usage

    t is the language donn eґ in which we conduct our lives.... We have no other. And the danger is that formal linguistic models, in their loosely argued analogy with the axiomatic structure of the mathematical sciences, may block perception.... It is quite conceivable that, in language, continuous induction from simple, elemental units to more complex, realistic forms is not justified. The extent and formal "undecidability" of context-and every linguistic particle above the level of the phoneme is context-bound-may make it impossible, except in the most abstract, meta-linguistic sense, to pass from "pro-verbs," "kernals," or "deep deep structures" to actual speech. (Steiner, 1975, pp. 111-113)

    18) When a Language Is an Abstract Machine

   A higher-level formal language is an abstract machine. (Weizenbaum, 1976, p. 113)

    19) Metaphor and Metonymy Underpin the Formation of Linguistic Signs

   Jakobson sees metaphor and metonymy as the characteristic modes of binarily opposed polarities which between them underpin the two-fold process of selection and combination by which linguistic signs are formed.... Thus messages are constructed, as Saussure said, by a combination of a "horizontal" movement, which combines words together, and a "vertical" movement, which selects the particular words from the available inventory or "inner storehouse" of the language. The combinative (or syntagmatic) process manifests itself in contiguity (one word being placed next to another) and its mode is metonymic. The selective (or associative) process manifests itself in similarity (one word or concept being "like" another) and its mode is metaphoric. The "opposition" of metaphor and metonymy therefore may be said to represent in effect the essence of the total opposition between the synchronic mode of language (its immediate, coexistent, "vertical" relationships) and its diachronic mode (its sequential, successive, lineal progressive relationships). (Hawkes, 1977, pp. 77-78)

    20) Language and the Analysis of Nature

   It is striking that the layered structure that man has given to language constantly reappears in his analyses of nature. (Bronowski, 1977, p. 121)

    21) Correspondence Rules for Mapping Old Theory into Subsets of New Theory

   First, [an ideal intertheoretic reduction] provides us with a set of rules"correspondence rules" or "bridge laws," as the standard vernacular has it-which effect a mapping of the terms of the old theory (T o) onto a subset of the expressions of the new or reducing theory (T n). These rules guide the application of those selected expressions of T n in the following way: we are free to make singular applications of their correspondencerule doppelgangers in T o....

   Second, and equally important, a successful reduction ideally has the outcome that, under the term mapping effected by the correspondence rules, the central principles of T o (those of semantic and systematic importance) are mapped onto general sentences of T n that are theorems of Tn. (P. Churchland, 1979, p. 81)

    22) The Inclusion of Non- linguistic Factors in a Theory of Grammar

   If non-linguistic factors must be included in grammar: beliefs, attitudes, etc. [this would] amount to a rejection of the initial idealization of language as an object of study. A priori such a move cannot be ruled out, but it must be empirically motivated. If it proves to be correct, I would conclude that language is a chaos that is not worth studying.... Note that the question is not whether beliefs or attitudes, and so on, play a role in linguistic behavior and linguistic judgments... [but rather] whether distinct cognitive structures can be identified, which interact in the real use of language and linguistic judgments, the grammatical system being one of these. (Chomsky, 1979, pp. 140, 152-153)

    23) Language Is Inevitably Inﬂuenced by Specific Contexts of Human Interaction

   Language cannot be studied in isolation from the investigation of "rationality." It cannot afford to neglect our everyday assumptions concerning the total behavior of a reasonable person.... An integrational linguistics must recognize that human beings inhabit a communicational space which is not neatly compartmentalized into language and nonlanguage.... It renounces in advance the possibility of setting up systems of forms and meanings which will "account for" a central core of linguistic behavior irrespective of the situation and communicational purposes involved. (Harris, 1981, p. 165)

    24) The Genetic Blueprints of Language

   By innate [linguistic knowledge], Chomsky simply means "genetically programmed." He does not literally think that children are born with language in their heads ready to be spoken. He merely claims that a "blueprint is there, which is brought into use when the child reaches a certain point in her general development. With the help of this blueprint, she analyzes the language she hears around her more readily than she would if she were totally unprepared for the strange gabbling sounds which emerge from human mouths. (Aitchison, 1987, p. 31)

    25) Languages Are Machines

   Looking at ourselves from the computer viewpoint, we cannot avoid seeing that natural language is our most important "programming language." This means that a vast portion of our knowledge and activity is, for us, best communicated and understood in our natural language.... One could say that natural language was our first great original artifact and, since, as we increasingly realize, languages are machines, so natural language, with our brains to run it, was our primal invention of the universal computer. One could say this except for the sneaking suspicion that language isn't something we invented but something we became, not something we constructed but something in which we created, and recreated, ourselves. (Leiber, 1991, p. 8)

Historical dictionary of quotations in cognitive science > Language
14 calor

m.

1 heat (temperatura alta).

al calor de la lumbre by the fireside

este abrigo da mucho calor this coat is very warm

entrar en calor to get warm; to warm up (figurative) (público, deportista)

hace calor it's warm o hot

tener calor to be warm o hot

calor animal body heat

calor específico (physics) specific heat

2 warmth (afecto, entusiasmo).

el calor del público the warmth of the audience

3 ardor, eagerness, fervor, zeal.

4 hot weather, suffocating heat.

5 cauma.

* * *

calor

► nombre masculino

1 heat, warmth

■ hace calor it is hot

■ tengo calor I'm hot

2 figurado (actividad) heat

■ en el calor del debate in the heat of the debate

3 figurado (afecto) warmth

\

FRASEOLOGÍA

al calor de figurado under the wing of

■ fue criado al calor de sus abuelos he was brought up under his grandparents' wing

entrar en calor to get warm 2 DEPORTE to warm up

calor natural natural heat

el calor del hogar figurado the warmth of home

* * *

noun m.

1) heat

2) warmth

* * *

SM
[a veces] SF
1) (=alta temperatura) heat

no puedo dormir con este calor — I can't sleep in this heat

no soporto los calores del verano — I can't cope with the heat in summer

un material resistente al calor — a heat-resistant material

¡qué calor! — it's really hot!

nos sentamos al calor de la chimenea — we sat by the heat of the fire, we sat by the warm fireside

• dar calor, el fuego da un calorcito muy agradable — the fire gives off a very pleasant heat

esta camiseta me da demasiado calor — this shirt is too hot o warm

• entrar en calor — to get warm

un café para entrar en calor — a coffee to warm you/us up

• hacer calor — to be hot

hace muchísimo calor — it's very hot

mañana hará mucho calor — it will be very hot tomorrow

• pasar calor — to be hot

nunca he pasado tanto calor como hoy — I've never been o felt as hot as today

• tener calor — to be hot

tengo mucho calor — I'm very hot
asar 2.
2) (=afecto) warmth and affection

un niño falto de calor — a child deprived of warmth and affection

calor humano — human warmth

3) pl calores [de la menopausia] hot flushes, hot flashes (EEUU)

* * *

masculino

[Use of the feminine gender, although common in some areas, is generally considered to be archaic or non-standard]

1) (Fís) heat

2)

a) (Meteo) heat

con este calor no puedo trabajar — I can't work in this heat

hoy hace calor — it's hot today

hacía un calor agobiante — the heat was stifling o suffocating

hace un calorcillo agradable — it's pleasantly warm

b) ( sensación)

tener calor — to be hot

pasamos un calor horrible — it was terribly o unbearably hot

entrar en calor — to get warm

esta chaqueta me da mucho calor — I feel very hot in this jacket

al calor del fuego/de la lumbre — by the fireside

3) ( afecto) warmth

un hogar falto de calor — a home lacking in warmth and affection

4) calores masculino plural ( de la menopausia) hot flashes (pl) (AmE), hot flushes (pl) (BrE)

* * *

= heat, warmth.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex. The spark of warmth had emboldened her.

----

* achicharrarse de calor = bake.

* al calor de la lumbre = round-the-fireside.

* asarse de calor = bake.

* bocanada de calor = gust of warm air, gust of hot air, gust of heat.

* bomba de calor = heat pump.

* calor abrasador = scorching heat, blistering heat, torrid heat.

* calor achicharrante = scorching heat, blistering heat.

* calor extremo = extreme heat.

* calor infernal = scorching heat, blistering heat.

* calor sofocante = torrid heat.

* calor tórrido = scorching heat, torrid heat, blistering heat.

* día de mucho calor = scorcher.

* durante las horas de más calor = during the heat of the day.

* estrés causado por el calor = heat stress.

* estrés debido al calor = heat stress.

* intercambio de calor = heat exchange.

* ola de calor = heat wave.

* oleada de calor = heat wave.

* pantalla susceptible al calor = sensitive screen.

* pérdida de calor = heat loss.

* que hace entrar en calor = warming.

* que retiene el calor = heat absorbing.

* resistente al calor = heat-resistant.

* si no aguantas el calor, sal de la cocina = if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen.

* * *

masculino

[Use of the feminine gender, although common in some areas, is generally considered to be archaic or non-standard]

1) (Fís) heat

2)

a) (Meteo) heat

con este calor no puedo trabajar — I can't work in this heat

hoy hace calor — it's hot today

hacía un calor agobiante — the heat was stifling o suffocating

hace un calorcillo agradable — it's pleasantly warm

b) ( sensación)

tener calor — to be hot

pasamos un calor horrible — it was terribly o unbearably hot

entrar en calor — to get warm

esta chaqueta me da mucho calor — I feel very hot in this jacket

al calor del fuego/de la lumbre — by the fireside

3) ( afecto) warmth

un hogar falto de calor — a home lacking in warmth and affection

4) calores masculino plural ( de la menopausia) hot flashes (pl) (AmE), hot flushes (pl) (BrE)

* * *

= heat, warmth.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex: The spark of warmth had emboldened her.

* achicharrarse de calor = bake.

* al calor de la lumbre = round-the-fireside.

* asarse de calor = bake.

* bocanada de calor = gust of warm air, gust of hot air, gust of heat.

* bomba de calor = heat pump.

* calor abrasador = scorching heat, blistering heat, torrid heat.

* calor achicharrante = scorching heat, blistering heat.

* calor extremo = extreme heat.

* calor infernal = scorching heat, blistering heat.

* calor sofocante = torrid heat.

* calor tórrido = scorching heat, torrid heat, blistering heat.

* día de mucho calor = scorcher.

* durante las horas de más calor = during the heat of the day.

* estrés causado por el calor = heat stress.

* estrés debido al calor = heat stress.

* intercambio de calor = heat exchange.

* ola de calor = heat wave.

* oleada de calor = heat wave.

* pantalla susceptible al calor = sensitive screen.

* pérdida de calor = heat loss.

* que hace entrar en calor = warming.

* que retiene el calor = heat absorbing.

* resistente al calor = heat-resistant.

* si no aguantas el calor, sal de la cocina = if you can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen.

* * *

calor

masculine

[Use of the feminine gender, although common in some areas, is generally considered to be archaic or non-standard]

A ( Fís) heat

B

1 [ Vocabulary notes (Spanish) ] ( Meteo) heat

con este calor no dan ganas de trabajar you don't feel like working in this heat

hoy hace calor it's hot today

hacía un calor agobiante the heat was stifling o suffocating

hace un calorcillo agradable it's pleasantly warm

2

(sensación): ¿tienes calor? are you hot?

en el viaje pasamos un calor horrible it was terribly o unbearably hot on the journey

me estoy asando de calor ( fam); I'm baking o roasting ( colloq), I'm boiling ( colloq)

tómate esta sopa para entrar en calor drink this soup, it'll warm you up o drink this soup to warm yourself up

me puse a saltar para entrar en calor I started jumping up and down to get warm

esta chaqueta me da mucho calor I feel very hot in this jacket

al calor del fuego/de la lumbre by the fireside

C (afecto) warmth

un hogar falto de calor a home lacking in warmth and affection

D

1

( RPl fam) (vergüenza, apuro): me da calor ir a pedirle plata I'm embarrassed to go and ask him for money

2 ( RPl fam) calores mpl (de la menopausia) hot flashes (pl) ( AmE), hot flushes (pl) ( BrE)

* * *

calor sustantivo masculino Use of the feminine gender, although common in some areas, is generally considered to be archaic or non-standard
1
a) (Fis, Meteo) heat;

◊ hace calor it's hot;

hacía un calor agobiante the heat was stifling o suffocating
b) ( sensación):

◊ tener calor to be hot;

pasamos un calor horrible it was terribly hot;
entrar en calor to get warm;
esta chaqueta me da mucho calor I feel very hot in this jacket;
al calor del fuego by the fireside
2 ( afecto) warmth
3
◊ calores sustantivo masculino plural ( de la menopausia) hot flashes (pl) (AmE), hot flushes (pl) (BrE)

calor sustantivo masculino
1 heat: hacía mucho calor, it was very hot
pasar/tener calor, to feel hot o to be hot
en el calor de la noche, in the heat of the night
2 (afecto, cariño) warmth: el niño echa en falta el calor de una madre, the boy needs some motherly love
3 (pasión) ardour US ardor: discutieron con calor la propuesta, they had a heated discussion about the proposal
♦ Locuciones: entrar en calor, to warm up
al calor de, beside: nos reunimos al calor de la lumbre, we gathered around the bonfire
Si quieres combinar esta palabra con los verbos hacer o tener, debes usar respectivamente to be y to feel/be: Hace calor. It's hot. Tengo calor. I feel hot o I am hot.
' calor' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
abarquillarse
- abrigar
- achicharrarse
- aplatanada
- aplatanado
- apretar
- ardor
- asada
- asado
- asarse
- asfixiante
- bastante
- bocanada
- bochorno
- calentar
- caliente
- calurosa
- caluroso
- cocerse
- colorada
- colorado
- débil
- demonio
- disminuir
- enfermar
- entrar
- extemporánea
- extemporáneo
- fuera
- insensible
- irradiar
- mucha
- mucho
- pasar
- quemazón
- quien
- reflector
- reflectora
- residual
- sofocante
- sofocarse
- sofoco
- sol
- vaya
- abrigo
- absorber
- absorción
- acalorado
- achicharrante
- adentro
English:
as
- B.T.U.
- bake
- baking
- be
- blistering
- boiling
- certainly
- conduct
- diffuse
- dog days
- emit
- exposure
- feel
- floodlight
- great
- heat
- heat-seeking
- heatwave
- hot
- interminable
- oppressive
- phew
- retain
- roast
- scorcher
- shall
- spell
- suffocating
- that
- used
- very
- warm
- warm up
- warmth
- bask
- become
- Calor Gas
- quite
- roasting

* * *

calor nm

1. [temperatura alta] heat;
[tibieza] warmth;
el calor dilata los cuerpos heat causes bodies to expand;

al calor de la lumbre by the fireside;

asarse de calor to be roasting, to be boiling hot;

este abrigo da mucho calor this coat is very warm;

entrar en calor to get warm;
[público, deportista] to warm up;
hace calor it's warm o hot;

¡qué calor (hace)! it's so hot!;

tener calor to be warm o hot;

voy a abrir la ventana, tengo calor I'm going to open the window, I'm too hot

Comp
calor animal body heat;
calor blanco white heat;
Fís calor específico specific heat;
calor latente latent heat;

calor negro electric heating;

calor radiante radiant heat

2. [afecto, entusiasmo] warmth;

la emocionó el calor del público she was moved by the warmth of the audience

Comp
calor humano human warmth
3. RP Fam [vergüenza] embarrassment;

me da calor hablar en público I get embarrassed if I have to speak in public

4. RP
calores [de la menopausia] hot flushes o US flashes

* * *

calor

m

1 heat;

hace mucho calor it’s very hot;

tengo calor I’m hot

2 fig

warmth;

entrar en calor get warm

3

:

al calor de fig: ayuda económica, contactos thanks to

* * *

calor nm

1) : heat

hace calor: it's hot outside

tener calor: to feel hot

2) : warmth, affection

3) : ardor, passion

* * *

calor n heat

hacer calor to be hot

hace mucho calor hoy it's very hot today

tener calor to be hot

tengo mucho calor I'm very hot

Spanish-English dictionary > calor
15 delicado

adj.

1 delicate, frail, breakable, fragile.

2 touch-and-go, delicate, sensible.

3 finicky, overparticular about trivial details, fiddly, pernickety.

* * *

delicado

► adjetivo

1 (fino) delicate; (exquisito) exquisite; (refinado) refined

■ un color delicado a delicate colour

2 (difícil) delicate, difficult

■ una situación delicada a delicate situation

3 (enfermizo) frail, delicate

4 (frágil) fragile

5 (exigente) fussy, fastidious, hard to please

6 (cortés) refined, polite

7 (muy sensible) hypersensitive, extremely sensitive

\

FRASEOLOGÍA

manjar delicado delicacy

* * *

(f. - delicada)

adj.

1) delicate

2) fine

3) ill

4) sensitive

5) tactful

* * *

ADJ

1) (=suave) [tejido, piel] delicate; [tela] fine; [color] soft

2) (=frágil) [máquina] sensitive; [salud] delicate

está delicado del estómago — he has a delicate stomach

3) (=fino) [rasgos] delicate, fine; [gusto] delicate, subtle

4) (=difícil) [situación] delicate, tricky; [punto] sore; [tema] delicate

5) [persona] (=difícil de contentar) hard to please, fussy; (=sensible) hypersensitive; (=discreto) tactful; (=atento) considerate

es muy delicado con la comida — he's very choosy about his food *

* * *

- da adjetivo

1) ( fino) <rasgos/manos> delicate; < sabor> delicate, subtle; <lenguaje/modales> refined

2)

a) ( que requiere cuidados) <cerámica/cristal> fragile; < tela> delicate; < piel> sensitive

prendas delicadas — delicates, delicate garments

la delicada piel del bebé — the baby's delicate skin

b) ( refiriéndose a la salud) delicate

está delicado del estómago — his stomach's a little delicate

tiene el corazón delicado — he has a weak o bad heart

3) <asunto/cuestión/tema> delicate, sensitive; < situación> delicate, tricky

4)

a) ( melindroso) delicate, fussy

b) ( susceptible) touchy

* * *

= gentle [gentler -comp., gentlest -sup.], sensitive, tricky [trickier -comp., trickiest -sup.], delicate, ticklish, awkward, choosy [choosey] [choosier -comp., choosiest -sup.], touchy, frail, tender [tenderer -comp., tenderest -sup.], dainty [daintier -comp., daintiest -sup.], lissom(e), fragile, fussy [fussier -comp., fussiest -sup.], picky [pickier -comp., pickiest -sup.].

Ex. Melanie Stanton broke into a gentle laugh as she recalled him executing a shuffling fandango and announcing mischievously, 'Women in the SLA, get ready, here I come!'.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex. Bertrand Russell has written a great deal of sense about the tricky problem of individual liberty and achievement and its relationship to government control.

Ex. Despite the incompetence of most eighteenth-century block-makers, woodcuts never quite disappeared, and they returned to favour in the delicate form called 'wood-engraving' at the end of the hand-press period.

Ex. The vast majority of management problems, even those which seem at first glance to be wholly planning or organizing or controlling problems, usually turn out to be bristling with ticklish human relations problems.

Ex. Access is impaired by archaic, awkward, or simply strange headings that most normal persons would never look for on their first try.

Ex. I became a hungry reader who was not choosy at all about the food.

Ex. Censorship is a touchy subject with prison librarians.

Ex. Previous research has demonstrated that frail elderly living in subsidized high-rise apartments have greater unmet needs than elderly who reside in traditional community housing.

Ex. A single drawing can have a highly emotional impact and can be effective as either a heavy, bold statement or a tender reminder.

Ex. They then went to a rather dainty little Italian restaurant where they ate a scrumptious meal and drank a bottle of wine.

Ex. She is not just lissome and beautiful, but also cultured, artful, expressive, and energetic.

Ex. The material which carries the message is fragile.

Ex. Librarians are expected, by their popular media image, to be fussy, nit-picking, pedants.

Ex. If by chance she gets close to a boy that she likes she suddenly get very picky and think of all his negative points.

----

* asunto delicado = sore subject, sore spot, sore point, sensitive issue, hot potato.

* pregunta delicada = awkward question.

* ser muy delicado con la comida = be a picky eater.

* ser muy delicado para comer = be a picky eater.

* tejido muy delicado = gossamer.

* tema delicado = sore subject, sore spot, sore point, sensitive issue, hot potato.

* * *

- da adjetivo

1) ( fino) <rasgos/manos> delicate; < sabor> delicate, subtle; <lenguaje/modales> refined

2)

a) ( que requiere cuidados) <cerámica/cristal> fragile; < tela> delicate; < piel> sensitive

prendas delicadas — delicates, delicate garments

la delicada piel del bebé — the baby's delicate skin

b) ( refiriéndose a la salud) delicate

está delicado del estómago — his stomach's a little delicate

tiene el corazón delicado — he has a weak o bad heart

3) <asunto/cuestión/tema> delicate, sensitive; < situación> delicate, tricky

4)

a) ( melindroso) delicate, fussy

b) ( susceptible) touchy

* * *

= gentle [gentler -comp., gentlest -sup.], sensitive, tricky [trickier -comp., trickiest -sup.], delicate, ticklish, awkward, choosy [choosey] [choosier -comp., choosiest -sup.], touchy, frail, tender [tenderer -comp., tenderest -sup.], dainty [daintier -comp., daintiest -sup.], lissom(e), fragile, fussy [fussier -comp., fussiest -sup.], picky [pickier -comp., pickiest -sup.].

Ex: Melanie Stanton broke into a gentle laugh as she recalled him executing a shuffling fandango and announcing mischievously, 'Women in the SLA, get ready, here I come!'.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex: Bertrand Russell has written a great deal of sense about the tricky problem of individual liberty and achievement and its relationship to government control.

Ex: Despite the incompetence of most eighteenth-century block-makers, woodcuts never quite disappeared, and they returned to favour in the delicate form called 'wood-engraving' at the end of the hand-press period.

Ex: The vast majority of management problems, even those which seem at first glance to be wholly planning or organizing or controlling problems, usually turn out to be bristling with ticklish human relations problems.

Ex: Access is impaired by archaic, awkward, or simply strange headings that most normal persons would never look for on their first try.

Ex: I became a hungry reader who was not choosy at all about the food.

Ex: Censorship is a touchy subject with prison librarians.

Ex: Previous research has demonstrated that frail elderly living in subsidized high-rise apartments have greater unmet needs than elderly who reside in traditional community housing.

Ex: A single drawing can have a highly emotional impact and can be effective as either a heavy, bold statement or a tender reminder.

Ex: They then went to a rather dainty little Italian restaurant where they ate a scrumptious meal and drank a bottle of wine.

Ex: She is not just lissome and beautiful, but also cultured, artful, expressive, and energetic.

Ex: The material which carries the message is fragile.

Ex: Librarians are expected, by their popular media image, to be fussy, nit-picking, pedants.

Ex: If by chance she gets close to a boy that she likes she suddenly get very picky and think of all his negative points.

* asunto delicado = sore subject, sore spot, sore point, sensitive issue, hot potato.

* pregunta delicada = awkward question.

* ser muy delicado con la comida = be a picky eater.

* ser muy delicado para comer = be a picky eater.

* tejido muy delicado = gossamer.

* tema delicado = sore subject, sore spot, sore point, sensitive issue, hot potato.

* * *

delicado -da

adjective

A (fino) ‹rasgos/manos› delicate; ‹sabor› delicate, subtle; ‹lenguaje/modales› refined

¡qué delicada eres! ¿qué más da si está un poco quemado? you're so fussy! what does it matter if it's a little burned?

B (que requiere cuidados) ‹cerámica/cristal› fragile; ‹tela› delicate

prendas delicadas delicates, delicate garments

una crema para pieles delicadas a cream for sensitive skin

la delicada piel del bebé the baby's delicate skin

¡qué delicado eres! no lo dijo por molestarte don't be so touchy! he didn't mean to upset you

C (refiriéndose a la salud) delicate

está delicado del estómago his stomach's a little delicate

tiene el corazón delicado he has a weak o delicate o bad heart

después de la operación quedó muy delicado he was very frail o weak after his operation

D ‹asunto/cuestión/tema› delicate, sensitive; ‹situación› delicate, tricky

* * *

delicado
◊ -da adjetivo

1 ( fino) ‹rasgos/manos› delicate;
‹ sabor› delicate, subtle;
‹lenguaje/modales› refined
2
a) ( que requiere cuidados) ‹cerámica/cristal› fragile;

‹ tela› delicate;
‹ piel› sensitive
b) ‹salud/estómago› delicate;

‹ corazón› weak
3 ‹asunto/cuestión/tema› delicate, sensitive;
‹ situación› delicate, tricky
4
a) ( melindroso) delicate, fussy

b) ( susceptible) touchy

delicado,-a adjetivo
1 (frágil, primoroso) delicate
una delicada porcelana, a delicate porcelain figure
ese jarrón es muy delicado, that vase is very fragile
2 (enfermizo) delicate: está delicada del corazón, she has a weak heart
3 (exigente) fussy, hard to please: Juan es muy delicado para la comida, Juan is a fussy eater
4 (difícil de tratar) un asunto delicado, a delicate matter
' delicado' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
delicada
- dulce
- exquisita
- exquisito
- primor
- asunto
- embromado
- fregado
- jorobado
- maniático
- melindroso
- remilgón
- tema
English:
dainty
- delicate
- fine
- fragile
- frail
- picky
- sensitive
- slight
- sore
- subject
- subtle
- ticklish
- touch on
- touchy
- tricky
- awkward
- delicacy
- shaky
- subtlety

* * *

delicado, -a adj

1. [aroma, gesto, manos] delicate;

un perfume muy delicado a very delicate perfume

2. [material, objeto] delicate;

piel delicada sensitive o delicate skin;

loción hidratante para pieles delicadas moisturizing lotion for sensitive skin;

detergente para ropa delicada o [m5] prendas delicadas detergent for delicates

3. [asunto, situación] delicate, tricky;

una situación delicada a delicate o tricky situation

4. [persona] [débil, enfermizo] weak, delicate;

su estado (de salud) es delicado his condition is delicate;

estar delicado de salud to have delicate health;

estar delicado del corazón to have a weak heart

5. [persona] [sensible] sensitive

6. [educado] [persona] polite;
[lenguaje, modales] refined
7. [persona] [tiquismiquis] fussy, choosy, picky;

es demasiado delicado para ir de camping he likes his creature comforts too much to go camping;

¡no seas delicado, hay que comérselo todo! don't be so picky, you've got to eat all of it!

* * *

delicado

adj delicate

* * *

delicado, -da adj

1) : delicate, fine

2) : sensitive, frail

3) : difficult, tricky

4) : fussy, hard to please

5) : tactful, considerate

* * *

delicado adj delicate

la seda es un tejido muy delicado silk is a very delicate fabric

una situación delicada a delicate situation

Spanish-English dictionary > delicado
16 emotivo

adj.

emotional, moving, affective, emotive.

* * *

emotivo

► adjetivo

1 (persona) emotional; (acto ect) moving, touching; (palabras) emotive, stirring, rousing

* * *

(f. - emotiva)

adj.

emotional, moving, touching

* * *

ADJ [persona] emotional; [escena] moving, touching; [palabras] emotive, moving

* * *

- va adjetivo <desarrollo/mundo> emotional; <acto/discurso> moving, emotional; < persona> emotional

* * *

= emotive, sensitive.

Ex. These messages were examined for 'friendly' features, such as politeness, specificity, constructiveness and helpfulness, and for 'unfriendly' features, like the use of cryptic codes or vocabulary, or language which users might find threatening, domineering, or emotive.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

* * *

- va adjetivo <desarrollo/mundo> emotional; <acto/discurso> moving, emotional; < persona> emotional

* * *

= emotive, sensitive.

Ex: These messages were examined for 'friendly' features, such as politeness, specificity, constructiveness and helpfulness, and for 'unfriendly' features, like the use of cryptic codes or vocabulary, or language which users might find threatening, domineering, or emotive.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

* * *

emotivo -va

adjective

‹acto/discurso› moving, emotional; ‹persona› emotional

* * *

emotivo
◊ -va adjetivo ‹desarrollo/mundo/persona› emotional;

‹acto/discurso› moving, emotional
emotivo,-a adjetivo
1 (situación) emotional: fue una despedida muy emotiva, it was a very emotional farewell
2 (persona) sensitive, emotive
' emotivo' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
emotiva
English:
charged
- emotive
- emotional
- moving
- tearful

* * *

emotivo, -a adj

1. [persona, reencuentro] emotional

2. [escena, palabras, imágenes] moving

* * *

emotivo

adj

1 emotional

2 ( conmovedor) moving

* * *

emotivo, -va adj

: emotional, moving

* * *

emotivo adj emotional

Spanish-English dictionary > emotivo
17 pantalla susceptible al calor

(n.) = sensitive screen

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

* * *

(n.) = sensitive screen

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Spanish-English dictionary > pantalla susceptible al calor
18 perceptivo

adj.

perceptive, alert, insightful, sensitive.

* * *

perceptivo

► adjetivo

1 perceptive

* * *

ADJ perceptive

* * *

- va adjetivo perceptive

* * *

= sensitive, perceptual.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex. Human perceptual and conceptual capabilities bring an aspect of improvisation and reinterpretation to every human action.

* * *

- va adjetivo perceptive

* * *

= sensitive, perceptual.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex: Human perceptual and conceptual capabilities bring an aspect of improvisation and reinterpretation to every human action.

* * *

perceptivo -va

adjective

perceptive

* * *

perceptivo, -a adj

sensory

* * *

perceptivo

adj perceptive

Spanish-English dictionary > perceptivo
19 sensible

adj.

1 sensitive.

2 noticeable (evidente).

pérdidas sensibles significant losses

mostrar una sensible mejoría to show a noticeable improvement

3 tender, soft-hearted, softhearted.

4 sore.

5 sensible, significant.

* * *

sensible

► adjetivo

1 (capaz de sentir) sentient

2 (impresionable) sensitive

3 (piel, oído) sensitive

4 (perceptible) perceptible, appreciable, noticeable

5 (considerable) significant, considerable, sizeable

6 (que causa pena) terrible, sad

7 TÉCNICA (preciso) sensitive

\

FRASEOLOGÍA

lamentamos tan sensible pérdida formal we regret such a sad loss

* * *

adj.

sensitive

* * *

1. ADJ

1) [al dolor, al frío] sensitive

tiene la piel muy sensible — she has very sensitive skin

sensible a algo — sensitive to sth

es muy sensible a los cambios de temperatura — it's very sensitive to changes in temperature

los seres sensibles — sentient beings

2) (=impresionable) sensitive (a to)

es muy sensible y llora con facilidad — he is very sensitive and cries easily

3) (=perceptivo)

sensible a algo — sensitive to sth

es muy sensible a los problemas de la población — he is very sensitive to people's problems

Ana es muy sensible al arte — Ana has an artistic sensitivity

4) (=evidente) [cambio, diferencia] appreciable, noticeable; [pérdida] considerable

una sensible mejoría — a noticeable improvement

5) (Téc) sensitive (a to)
(Fot) sensitive
un aparato muy sensible — a very sensitive piece of equipment

una placa sensible a la luz — a light-sensitive plate

6) (=capaz)

sensible de — capable of

sensible de mejora — capable of improvement

2.

SF (Mús) leading note

* * *

adjetivo

1) (susceptible, impresionable) sensitive

2)

a) <piel/ojos> ( físicamente) sensitive

sensible A algo — sensitive to something

b) <instrumento/aparato> sensitive; (Fot) sensitive

3) (gen delante del n) (frml) ( ostensible) <cambio/diferencia> appreciable; < mejoría> noticiable; <aumento/pérdida> considerable

* * *

= responsive, sensitive, thin-skinned.

Ex. This catalog would then present a much more revealing, helpful, and responsive picture to the actual needs of the library user than the finding catalog.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex. Thin-skinned and narrow-minded people may not particularly enjoy a pluralistic society, but their discomfort is vastly outweighed by the benefits most of us.

----

* ayuda sensible al contexto = context-sensitive help.

* sensible a la luz = light-sensitive.

* sensible a la situación = situation-aware.

* sensible a los precios = price sensitive.

* sensible al tiempo = time-sensitive [time sensitive].

* sensible con respecto al género = gender sensitive.

* tema sensible = sore subject, sore spot, sore point.

* tocar la fibra sensible de = strike + a chord with.

* tocar una vena sensible = hit + home.

* * *

adjetivo

1) (susceptible, impresionable) sensitive

2)

a) <piel/ojos> ( físicamente) sensitive

sensible A algo — sensitive to something

b) <instrumento/aparato> sensitive; (Fot) sensitive

3) (gen delante del n) (frml) ( ostensible) <cambio/diferencia> appreciable; < mejoría> noticiable; <aumento/pérdida> considerable

* * *

= responsive, sensitive, thin-skinned.

Ex: This catalog would then present a much more revealing, helpful, and responsive picture to the actual needs of the library user than the finding catalog.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex: Thin-skinned and narrow-minded people may not particularly enjoy a pluralistic society, but their discomfort is vastly outweighed by the benefits most of us.

* ayuda sensible al contexto = context-sensitive help.

* sensible a la luz = light-sensitive.

* sensible a la situación = situation-aware.

* sensible a los precios = price sensitive.

* sensible al tiempo = time-sensitive [time sensitive].

* sensible con respecto al género = gender sensitive.

* tema sensible = sore subject, sore spot, sore point.

* tocar la fibra sensible de = strike + a chord with.

* tocar una vena sensible = hit + home.

* * *

sensible

adjective

A

1 (susceptible, impresionable) sensitive

2

(a las artes): es muy sensible a la música she has a great feeling for music o very good musical sense

no es nada sensible al arte he has no feeling for art

B

1 ‹piel/ojos› (físicamente) sensitive sensible A algo sensitive TO sth

2 ‹instrumento/aparato› sensitive; ( Fot) sensitive

C ( gen delante del n) ( frml) (ostensible, importante) appreciable

un aumento sensible en el precio del petróleo an appreciable rise o a sizeable increase in the price of oil

ha habido una sensible disminución en el número de accidentes there has been a noticeable o an appreciable drop in the number of accidents

ha mostrado una sensible mejoría she has shown marked improvement

la sequía ha ocasionado sensibles pérdidas the drought has caused significant losses

sus familiares lamentan tan sensible pérdida the family mourn his terrible loss ( frml)

* * *

sensible adjetivo
1 ( en general) sensitive;
sensible A algo sensitive to sth
2 ( gen delante del n) (frml) ( ostensible) ‹cambio/diferencia› appreciable;
‹ mejoría› noticable;
‹aumento/pérdida› considerable
sensible adjetivo
1 (persona, aparato) sensitive
2 (notable, evidente) clear
una sensible diferencia, a marked difference: no supuso un cambio sensible en sus vidas, it meant no great change in their lives
' sensible' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
atinada
- atinado
- fibra
- para
- persona
- prudente
- sabia
- sabio
- sensata
- sensato
- sentada
- sentado
- tan
- consciente
- juicioso
English:
emotional
- factor
- feeling
- hypersensitive
- responsive
- sensible
- sensitive
- squeamish
- susceptible
- tender
- thick-skinned
- touch-sensitive
- irritable
- mature
- rational
- sane
- sense
- skin

* * *

sensible adj

1. [susceptible] sensitive;

yo soy más sensible al frío que mi hermano I feel the cold more than my brother;

una planta muy sensible a los cambios de temperatura a plant which is very sensitive to changes in temperature;

mis ojos son muy sensibles a la luz my eyes are very sensitive to the light

2. [emocionalmente] sensitive;

no se lo digas directamente, es muy sensible don't just tell her straight out, she's very sensitive

3. [evidente] noticeable;
[importante] significant;
muestra una sensible mejoría he has shown a noticeable improvement;

hay una sensible diferencia entre las dos culturas the two cultures are perceptibly different;

pérdidas sensibles significant losses;

se espera una subida sensible de las temperaturas a significant rise in temperatures is expected

4. [instrumento, película] sensitive

* * *

sensible

adj

1 persona, dispositivo sensitive;

sensible al calor/a la luz heat-/light-sensitive

2 ( apreciable) appreciable, noticeable

* * *

sensible adj

1) : sensitive

2) apreciable: considerable, significant

* * *

sensible adj

1. (en general) sensitive

es una chica muy sensible she's a very sensitive girl

soy muy sensible al frío I'm very sensitive to the cold

2. (perceptible, apreciable) noticeable

ha habido un aumento sensible de la temperatura there's been a noticeable rise in temperature

Spanish-English dictionary > sensible
20 susceptible

adj.

1 oversensitive (sensible).

2 susceptible, delicate, easily offended, sensitive.

* * *

susceptible

► adjetivo

1 (gen) susceptible

2 (sensible) oversensitive

3 (propenso a ofenderse) touchy

\

FRASEOLOGÍA

susceptible de (con tendencia a) liable to 2 (capaz de) capable of

■ el proyecto es susceptible de mejora the project leaves room for improvement

* * *

adj.

1) sensitive

2) susceptible

* * *

ADJ

1)

susceptible de — capable of

susceptible de mejora(r) — capable of improvement

susceptible de sufrir daño — liable to suffer damage

2) [persona] susceptible

susceptible a las críticas — sensitive to criticism

* * *

adjetivo

1) < persona> sensitive, touchy

susceptible A algo — sensitive to something

2) (frml) ( capaz)

susceptible DE algo: es susceptible de mejora there is room for improvement; órganos susceptibles de ser transplantados organs which can be transplanted; es susceptible de alteraciones — it's subject to alterations

* * *

= likely, sensitive, touchy, thin-skinned.

Ex. The most likely causes of brain damage among low birthweight infants are prematurity and infections, not oxygen starvation.

Ex. Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex. Censorship is a touchy subject with prison librarians.

Ex. Thin-skinned and narrow-minded people may not particularly enjoy a pluralistic society, but their discomfort is vastly outweighed by the benefits most of us.

----

* demasiado susceptible = oversensitive.

* de un modo susceptible = sensitively.

* no susceptible = unsusceptible.

* pantalla susceptible al calor = sensitive screen.

* ser susceptible de = be vulnerable to.

* ser susceptible de cambios = be subject to change.

* susceptible a los precios = price sensitive.

* susceptible de = susceptible to.

* susceptible de error = susceptible to error, susceptible to mistake.

* * *

adjetivo

1) < persona> sensitive, touchy

susceptible A algo — sensitive to something

2) (frml) ( capaz)

susceptible DE algo: es susceptible de mejora there is room for improvement; órganos susceptibles de ser transplantados organs which can be transplanted; es susceptible de alteraciones — it's subject to alterations

* * *

= likely, sensitive, touchy, thin-skinned.

Ex: The most likely causes of brain damage among low birthweight infants are prematurity and infections, not oxygen starvation.

Ex: Numerous different models are available, ranging from models where communication is via a heat sensitive screen, through to terminals linked to an outside computer by a telephone line.

Ex: Censorship is a touchy subject with prison librarians.

Ex: Thin-skinned and narrow-minded people may not particularly enjoy a pluralistic society, but their discomfort is vastly outweighed by the benefits most of us.

* demasiado susceptible = oversensitive.

* de un modo susceptible = sensitively.

* no susceptible = unsusceptible.

* pantalla susceptible al calor = sensitive screen.

* ser susceptible de = be vulnerable to.

* ser susceptible de cambios = be subject to change.

* susceptible a los precios = price sensitive.

* susceptible de = susceptible to.

* susceptible de error = susceptible to error, susceptible to mistake.

* * *

susceptible

adjective

A ‹persona› sensitive, touchy susceptible A algo sensitive TO sth

es muy susceptible a las críticas he's very sensitive to criticism

B ( frml) (capaz) susceptible DE algo:

es susceptible de mejora it can be improved, there is room for improvement ( frml)

órganos susceptibles de ser transplantados organs which can be transplanted

grupos susceptibles de cometer actos terroristas groups capable of committing terrorist acts

* * *

susceptible adjetivo ‹ persona› sensitive, touchy;
susceptible A algo sensitive to sth
susceptible adjetivo
1 (suspicaz) touchy
2 frml (capaz) susceptible
susceptible de mejora, improvable
' susceptible' also found in these entries:
Spanish:
sanable
- sentida
- sentido
- delicado
- quisquilloso
English:
amenable
- sensitive
- susceptible
- touchy
- immune
- subject

* * *

susceptible adj

1. [sensible] oversensitive

2. [modificable]
el proyecto es susceptible de cambios changes may be made to the project;

un plan susceptible de mejora a plan that can be improved on

* * *

susceptible

adj

1 persona touchy

2

:

ser susceptible de mejora leave room for improvement

* * *

susceptible adj

: susceptible, sensitive

♦ susceptibilidad nf

* * *

susceptible adj touchy [comp. touchier; superl. touchiest]

Spanish-English dictionary > susceptible

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computer models

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